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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the EU bureaucrats – Eurocrats – and their work. Special attention is 
placed on the Eurocrats’ work in EU Committees, working groups and council meeting. I 
have followed and observed their work first, through a trainee position at the Commission and 
second, by following the Swedish delegation to the Employment Committee meetings. The 
ethnographic study of the Eurocrats brings them to life as people of flesh and blood – beyond 
the stereotype. It shows that going by the book and forming technocratic EU decisions is not 
an option for these bureaucratic elites. They have to be flexible in handling their multiple 
roles and knowing when to play – and when to stop playing – the game. The paper shows that 
the roles Eurocrats play shift through the process: pendulum between articulating and 
defending ‘national’ positions and acting in the interest of the EU swings back and forth. In 
this way, the Eurocrats’ shifting roles contribute to the process of europeanisation. Sooner or 
later, playing the game in Brussels forces them to put on the hat of a ‘European’ formulating 
postnational EU decisions. These Eurocratic practices fashion that which we identify as the 
EU. We may debate if these EU policy decisions are changing the member states’ policies in 
any significant sense. Regardless, these Eurocrats are through their practices forming EU 
decisions that go beyond the nation state in a sense forming, if not to its fullest than at least, 
an embryo towards a postnational European community.  
   3
Introduction  
In the popular view of the EU, its bureaucrats are often seen as the epitome of what Herzfeld 
(1992: 71) identifies as the stereotype of a bureaucrat, namely a rigid, inflexible, boring 
person working for his bureau rather than its clients or society at large. EU bureaucrats are 
frequently associated with forming useless, interventionist policies, such as prescribing the 
size of a strawberry or the curve of a banana. Moreover, like its national counterparts, the EU 
bureaucracy is held to be a hierarchical system akin to that envisaged by Weber (1958: 196ff) 
with its emphasis on rules, uniformity and compliance.  
The bureaucratic stereotype only goes so far in describing the real world of EU 
policymaking processes. As one is drawn into that world it becomes clear that the individual 
bureaucrats who populate it are people of flesh and blood with different personalities and 
driven by different goals. Some of them are motivated by the urge to make the world a better 
place, some are just trying to do their job and perhaps climb the career ladder, some see 
themselves mainly as experts living up to the standards of their profession. Only few of them 
match the stereotype of the bureaucrat strictly following the rules. Overwhelmingly, 
bureaucratic players in EU policy processes are, of necessity, flexible people (Albrow, 1997: 
74). They don’t just apply rules. They take part in complex policymaking and organizational 
games. The skills they need to do well in these games vary markedly from the classic role 
description of the bureaucrat.  
In this chapter I describe how EU bureaucrats (from now on, Eurocrats) handle these 
games. I focus on those Eurocrats who have to accommodate the potentially conflicting roles 
of both national representative and member of an EU-level expert community. The notion of 
Eurocrat symbolises the entanglement (Callon, 1998; see also Hasselström, 2003; and Garsten 
and Montoya, 2004) of the member states in the EU. If bureaucrats have mainly been studied 
in their settled environment of the national ministries or the European commission, this 
chapter focuses on the nomadic life of the bureaucrats who travel to and from their home base 
and the EU meeting rooms in Brussels to design policies and make decisions.  
Studying Eurocrats at work in EU committees, working groups and councils are in focus, 
highlights the clash between the national and the supranational in a multinational arena such 
as the EU. National participants in these arenas have their institutional home in one member 
state, while regularly meeting with their peers from other countries in another – in this case 
the so-called city of Europe. They are bound by their national identification and their 
government’s official position. But when they meet with their counterparts from across the 
EU, it is to make common EU decisions.  
The travelling to these meetings here signifies a ‘liminal’ phase (Turner 1969: 95), an in 
between position. Literally as well as mentally, Eurocrats are moving from one part of their 
work - forming joint positions in the national bureaucratic arena characterised by 
interdepartmental fault lines and negotiations - to another part - that of being ‘national’ 
representatives in an arena characterised by international divisions and alliances. They have to 
shift their concentration and focus between these areas of work. This chapter focuses on EU 
issues and the way bureaucrats turn into real ‘Eurocrats’.  
I followed the Swedish as well as EU Commission Eurocrats around doing participant 
observation. First, I held a trainee position in the Directorate General of Employment and 
Social Affairs in the European Commission during the autumn of 2001. Throughout 2002, I 
became an ‘observer-member’ of the Swedish delegation to the EU Employment Committee. 
I attended its preparatory meetings at the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment and 
Communication, I went on its trips to Brussels, and sat in on the Employment Committee 
meetings in Brussels. The EU Employment Committee is the ‘first’ committee, in a hierarchy 
of EU committee, working group and council meetings, where the member states and the 
Commission discuss and negotiate on EU employment issues connected to the EU Lisbon   4
Strategy. It is there that most of the discussions and negotiations take place and in practice 
decisions are made before the formal decision is made in the Council of the European Union.  
 
Bureaucratic ‘entanglement’: shifting roles, lurking tensions 
The blurring of boundaries between the EU institutions and the member states has been 
described as ‘Europeanisation’. Most scholars portray Europeanisation as a process where the 
member states’ national policies, identities, beliefs, norms and institutional structures are 
influenced to some degree by their involvement with the EU institutions (see for example 
Cowles et al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; and Jacobsson et al., 2004). States 
become more Europeanized when the European dimension penetrates their national arenas of 
politics, policy and bureaucracy (Radaelli, 2003: 29-30). The idea is, in fact, used by the EU 
institutions as a way of enhancing its power by redefining national ideas of territory and 
citizenship (Borneman and Fowler, 1997: 487). 
EU membership in particular means that states surrender some of their independence to 
the EU institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
European Community Court of Justice. The idea of the nation state as controlling its people 
within a defined territory is also challenged by the movement of capital, goods, people, and 
services without hindrance across the EU. Cooper (2003: 36-7) argues that the idea of 
transparency between the member states has replaced national considerations about the 
balance of power and raison d’état as master ideas. In this way membership in the EU should 
make the member states’ policies and political institutions more visible to one another and 
weaken grounds for suspicion. As a result, the arena for conflict becomes the meetings in the 
EU rather than the battlefields of war (Cooper, 2003: 35-36). So it is possible to argue the 
nation state is gradually taking on another form, based on multinational identities and 
accepting that state affairs are internationally transparent and ‘meddled’ in by other member 
states in the EU. As I have put forward elsewhere (Thedvall 2006 paraphrasing Malkki 1999: 
53ff), this may be seen as forming a post-national order.  
‘Post-national’ refers to the notion that the nation state - both nation and state - is losing 
sovereignty to the EU. A post-national community is emerging in Europe where the nation 
and nationalism no longer constitute the prime legitimising ground for its existence (Delanty 
and Rumford, 2005: 190). And yet the Eurocrats who convene at EU meetings are there as 
representatives of their nation states and are expected by their superiors in the capitals to act 
in the ‘national’ interest. Jacobsson and Mörth (1998: 199) argue that, paradoxically, EU-
membership has forced the member states to adopt a ‘national’ position in areas where until 
now they did not feel the need for one. In this way participating in the EU’s post-national 
project serves to uphold notions of the ‘national’ and the ‘nation state.’ Regardless of their 
aims, the way of working of institutions such as the EU assumes and even reinforces the 
national order of things (cf. Ben-Ari and Elron 2001: 275-276). Nonetheless, the Eurocrats 
still have to agree on common EU decisions where they, in part, surrender and modify their 
‘national’ interests to make possible an EU agreement. For Eurocrats therefore, it is not so 
much a question of being part of one or the other; instead their role as national or European 
agents shifts as the policy-making process evolves. 
Below, I seek to show the Eurocrats’ pendulum movements between acting in the interest 
of their nation state and acting on behalf of the EU making decisions that contribute to the 
process of Europeanisation. Even if the final decisions do not penetrate national policies, 
nonetheless they are forming a post-national EU community through these EU decisions. The 
contours of the national are continuously being negotiated in EU arenas, and the national 
communicates and negotiates with the post-national. Eurocrats are central to this process. It is 
their off-stage bureaucratic work as much as the on-stage politics of European leaders that 
fashions the EU identity.   5
 
Eurocrats at work 
 
What Eurocrats do  
Who are these Eurocrats and what do they do? In this case they are so-called experts on 
employment policies working to form a common European employment strategy with EU 
guidelines for employment and an agreed set of instruments to evaluate if these guidelines are 
followed by the member states. Broadly speaking, they are highly educated people with 
degrees in law, the social sciences and economics and with experience and expertise in labour 
market policy, labour law and econometrics. They are not street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 
1980) trying to implement policies. They are policy designers. As in classical bureaucratic 
theory, they offer advice to politicians, based on technical, politically neutral expertise. In 
reality, the implied difference between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’ becomes blurred (Weiss 
and Wodak, 2000: 76). The notion of expertise becomes especially problematic in the context 
of the EU since these Eurocrats have to act in the name of their nation state presenting 
‘national’ positions and argue in their member states’ political interest. The EU meeting 
format of having to adopt national positions emphasises the national, compelling Eurocrats to 
make their contributions as representatives of a nation state rather than as experts on 
employment policies. It politicises their work.  
Eurocrats handle their double roles as technocrats and politicians by acting as politicians 
but with the implicit understanding that they officially work according to the ideal of the 
Weberian-style bureaucrat (Thedvall 2006). In the meetings I saw them use both expertise-
based and political arguments. Yet the former were clearly privileged above the latter in the 
meetings. So, it was a pivotal part of their craft to identify technical if not scientific arguments 
that would work in the interest of their member states’ political ambitions. As participants in 
meetings, the Eurocrats had to keep in touch with the other member states’ political traditions 
and ambitions to understand their arguments. I also observed, however, that putting forward 
these differing national positions is only part of the policy-making game. It is most evident in 
the early stages of a policy process. When it came to collective decisions, Eurocrats put on 
their other hat. They worked towards compromise in order to arrive at a joint, EU decision. 
That done, they would switch roles again, reporting and explaining that decision back at their 
national ministries. In the sections below we follow the swings of the pendulum. 
 
Fashioning a ‘national’ position 
In the lead up to the EU committee meetings different activities took place within the national 
governments and the EU institutions. What happened at the meetings was connected to what 
had been discussed, written or thought of in other places. There were the Commission’s 
reports and the committee’s opinions that would form the basis for discussions in the meeting. 
And there were ‘national’ positions prepared in response to the reports and the opinions of the 
other member states’ Ministries. In the particular case reported here, the member states’ and 
the Commission’s representatives were going to meet in the EU Employment Committee to 
agree on indicators for quality in work. They were to be used as instruments for evaluating the 
quality member states’ labour markets. The Employment Committee consisted of two 
representatives from every member state with two alternates. These members were selected 
‘among senior officials or experts possessing outstanding competences in the field of 
employment and labour market policy in the member states’ (Council of the European Union 
2000: 21-22). Most of the members, at least one of the two, came from the Ministry of Labour 
(of some sort) in their member state. 
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In a preparatory meeting before an Employment Committee meeting a group of civil servants 
in the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication met for a couple of 
hours to prepare national positions. The following day the Swedish delegation was to travel to 
Brussels. The Commission’s report on the ‘quality in work’ indicators had been sent to the 
member states for the delegates to consider earlier. It was my second preparatory meeting in 
the Ministry. As I walked towards the office of Anders
1, a Swedish representative in the 
Committee, at the end of the corridor I exchanged pleasantries with Malin, another 
representative. When we arrived at Anders’ corner office in the old part of the Ministry 
Anders, Susanne and Peter, all Swedish representatives in the committee from the Ministry of 
Industry, were already seated round Anders’ meeting table. Also present were Hedda, an 
expert on health and safety at work in the Ministry of Industry; Tage, a Swedish 
representative in the Social Protection Committee from the Ministry of Health and Social 
affairs, and interested in the indicator on stress; and Erik an expert on taxes from the Ministry 
of Finance there to discuss the indicators on tax-benefit systems (not part of the quality in 
work indicators). They began to discuss the different policy issues at on the Committee’s 
agenda. What were the Swedish positions? Which position could conceivably be carried at the 
Committee’s meeting?  
One of the areas to be discussed in the Committee was a table and a possible composite 
indicator measuring the ‘flexibility and security’ facet of the ‘quality in work’ indicators. The 
Commission had proposed developing a composite indicator on the ‘extent to which part-time 
and fixed-term workers enjoy equivalent and commensurate entitlements to social protection 
and legal rights as full-time and permanent workers’ (Internal document from the meeting of 
the Employment Committee indicators group 4-5 July 2002). During the previous year the 
Committee had agreed on an indicator in this area: ‘number of employees working part-time, 
voluntarily and involuntarily, as a per cent of the total number of employees and of those with 
voluntary and involuntary fixed-term contracts as a per cent of total number of employees’. 
The proposed new composite indicator was meant to complement that indicator. It would be 
derived from a form that member states were encouraged to complete (see Table 7.1) 
 
Table 7.1: The Commission’s form on entitlements 
Social protection  Entitlement to   
  Part-time workers as % of all 
part-time workers 
Fixed-term workers as % of 
all fixed-term workers 
Unemployment benefits (pro 
rata entitlements 
  
Retirement pension (pro rata 
entitlements 
  
Health insurance     
Average entitlement 
coverage (composite 
indicator) 
  
 
Malin explained that the Commission now wanted to compile a table from the completed 
forms. She asked rhetorically if Sweden thought it was okay to draw up this table. She 
continued, saying she doubted Sweden wanted the Commission to distil a composite indicator 
from this table. She explained that the Commission wanted to divide the number of people 
working part-time or have fixed term contracts and have access to unemployment benefits and 
other social entitlements by the total number of people working part-time or have fixed-term 
contracts. Anders asked Hedda if there had not been a change in the law recently. Should not 
all who work part-time have the same rights as those who work full-time? Hedda answered   7
that this was the case. There was an EU directive to this effect. Anders replied that then it 
should be a 100% and the indicator would be unnecessary. Hedda answered that the law was 
written to prevent discrimination against part-time workers while allowing many different 
ways of interpreting the law. In which case Anders replied, the indicator might be feasible 
after all since there will be different interpretations in different member states. Nevertheless, 
he said they should be sceptical about the composite indicator. To develop the table was 
acceptable, but the arguments for developing a composite indicator were not convincing. It 
seemed impossible to measure reliably comparative entitlements. Malin also reminded us that 
at the last Committee meeting Sweden had said that parental-leave should be in the table. 
Anders said that we would have to point that out at the next meeting. ‘It is a typically Swedish 
question’, he said. At the time, the Swedish Minister for Employment Policy was concerned 
about gender equality. Parental leave was a hot topic for her. Anders recalled the minister had 
even stressed the issue of parental leave in a recent EU speech.  
There was little sign of bureaucratic conflict in the discussions. The atmosphere of the 
meeting was collegial and bland. The Swedish representatives understood the issue was a 
priority for the Swedish Minister of Industry, Employment and Communication. There was no 
disagreement on how this should translate into a Swedish national position at next day’s 
Committee meeting in Brussels. When they reached this conclusion, the representatives from 
other Ministries had already left. ‘Their’ questions had already been addressed and they had 
no concern with the bigger picture.  
 
The Committee meeting: Proposing ‘national’ positions 
Anders, Malin, Susanne and I entered the Commission’s conference centre in Brussels. We 
walked through the security check before taking the lift to the third floor. The conference 
centre has at least four meeting rooms on each floor in the five-storey building, and just 
before 10 a.m. there are always many people rushing to different meetings. In the hall on the 
third floor different languages were being spoken. People had flown in or taken trains or cars 
from their member states to attend the meetings today. 
The meeting room’s furnishing met my stereotype of what a bureaucratic institution 
would look like. It had old-fashioned furniture and grey-beige-brownish surroundings. There 
were floor-to-floor grey carpets. The tables were made of fake mahogany and the chairs were 
covered with beige cloth of the ‘office chair’ variety. The interpreters sat in booths behind 
glass windows. Their presence along the walls revealed that the meeting was multilingual; the 
languages translated that day were English, French and German, as shown on a board in a 
corner of the room. 
I found a seat behind the Swedish delegation, where I would be out of the way. The 
members were seated in a circle in front of me, with the member states in alphabetical order, 
taking the native spelling as the reference point.
2 In front of each member state’s row of seats 
was a sign showing that member state’s name. The Secretaries of the Committee, the 
President, and the Commission were seated between the United Kingdom and Belgium; that 
is, at the apex of the circle. Behind the circle there were seats for observers, like myself, for 
alternates to the members, and for the Commission’s presenters. These presenters were 
Commission officials who had worked on particular policy issues. They would take their seat 
beside the Commission’s representatives when it was time for their issues to be discussed. 
The presenters thus changed often according to the items on the agenda. 
The national delegations and the Commission’s representatives arrived and the room 
slowly filled up. There was a constant buzz around me of members greeting and kissing each 
other. The interpreters were taking their place in the translators’ booths. I examined my 
headset and made sure that it was set to ‘English’. I looked around the room and saw that one-
third of the members were women and that about half the delegations had brought an expert   8
along. He or she would be an alternate member of the group who changed depending on the 
question under discussion. The members were taking their seats. At about 10.15 a.m., the 
President of the Committee rang the bell, everyone fell silent and the meeting began. 
In the afternoon, the group turned to the subject of ‘flexibility and security’ that I had 
seen discussed in the preparatory meeting of the Swedish delegation. The Committee agreed it 
was difficult to develop composite indicators and the Commission was invited to do more 
work on it. There was no time pressure. They had a few months before they had to make the 
final recommendations to the Council. Malin, the Swedish delegate, pressed for including 
‘parental leave’ in the composite indicator, arguing that this component was as important as 
other benefits and social security schemes in the list. She said: 
 
Sweden supports the use of the complementary data in the table. We think the 
Commission can conclude the table but we should see it before the Employment 
Committee sees it. However, we believe that parental-leave should be included in the 
table. (Employment Committee Indicators group 4 July 2002) 
 
The Commission argued it would be too complicated. In addition, if it were to be included, 
conflicting ideas about gender equality politics in the member states would come to the fore. 
The member states had different institutional arrangements, reflecting different perceptions of 
gender roles and the responsibilities of men and women respectively. The Swedes certainly 
knew that Sweden would get an improved score if parental leave was included, but they also 
saw it as their responsibility to point out the omission whenever possible. The Swedish 
delegates, especially the women, spoke passionately about the issue of gender equality and 
work-life balance for both women and men. In the preparatory meetings as well as during 
lunches and dinner during the Committee’s meeting days they discussed among themselves 
the need to point out whenever a gender equality perspective was lacking. Clearly, they went 
beyond the call of duty; these Eurocrats’ personal passions and preoccupations coloured the 
amount of effort devoted to the issue.  
The same phenomenon occurred when the Indicators group discussed the use of a 
possible ‘labour market adaptability index.’ The index was presented by a research centre that 
had worked on the index. In its report, one of the key adaptability indicators was labour 
mobility. It had measured transitions between different jobs as well as transitions to a job 
among people who had been studying or had not been working the year before. At some point 
the text of the report read: ‘…of those in education and women “fulfilling domestic 
responsibilities” the year before’ (Scientific report presented by a research centre in the 
Employment Committee Indicators group, 5 July 2002).  
Susanne, the Swedish delegate signalled her wish to speak and the President of the 
Committee gave her the floor. Her voice was full of contrived innocence when she remarked: 
 
‘There seems to be a mistake in the study. It only says “women fulfilling domestic 
responsibilities”’ (Employment Committee Indicators group 5 July 2002). 
 
The representative from the research centre replied in earnest: 
 
‘No, men are not in the graph. Men make up only 1% so it makes no difference’  
(Employment Committee Indicators group 5 July 2002). 
 
Susanne persisted and now said sturdily: 
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‘Surely this varies between member states?’ (Employment Committee Indicators 
group 5 July 2002). 
 
The representative from the research centre answered, now smiling: 
 
‘Yes, I agree that it is higher in the Nordic member states. It could have been in but the 
 graphs would not be different (Employment Committee Indicators group 5 July 
 2002).’ 
 
Many of the Committee members sat their observing this dialogue, smiling as if they were 
thinking: ‘Okay, this is to be expected from the Swedes but we really do not take it seriously.’ 
Apparently, Susanne was acting out a self-assumed role of the Swedish representatives – 
relentlessly pointing out any gender-biased passages in the texts discussed at the Committee. 
Afterwards, Susanne, Malin and I had lunch and Susanne said that she was a bit irritated with 
herself that she had smiled back when they were smiling at her contribution. She felt that she 
had, by doing so, somehow degraded her own input. She said that this was the typical reaction 
as soon as she started to talk about gender equality (5 July 2002). However, the Swedish 
Eurocrats, interested in gender equality issues, wanted to make the point nevertheless - as they 
were expected to. As Anders pointed out, gender equality issues were regarded by the other 
members as a typically Swedish question, and it was understood that Swedish representatives 
would miss no opportunity to point these things out. 
 
Reporting back 
As the Swedish delegation returned to the Ministry of Industry they wrote a report from the 
meeting. They explained what the Swedish position had been and what had been agreed 
during the meeting. Long before that, however, the members of the Swedish delegation had 
begun to discuss how they had interpreted what had been said, to come to a similar 
understanding. In fact, they started doing so immediately after the meeting as we were 
walking back to the hotel. This conversation was important, because the game was not over. 
This particular session would not be the last Employment Committee Indicators group 
meeting before a formal decision had to be made in the Council of the European Union. There 
was a need to fine-tune the Swedish position before the next meeting. The Swedish 
delegation’s meeting report was sent to the relevant colleagues: about 10-15 people within the 
Employment Ministry as well as in other Ministries such as Health and Social Affairs, 
Education and Science, and Finance. If any politically salient issues were discussed, the State 
Secretary of the Ministry of Industry would be briefed. In this case, a further briefing was 
deemed unnecessary. The Eurocrats were implicitly trusted to act in the interest of the 
Swedish government. Later on, when the Council meetings were impending, there were more 
frequent contacts between the Minister of Employment and the Employment Committee 
members; for example, Malin took part in the Swedish preparations for the Council meeting. 
 
Agreeing on an EU decision 
Back at the Committee meeting, on other issues, there were more obvious disagreements, with 
member states sometimes changing their opinion during the meetings. They did so, for 
example, because new information was being disclosed. Or they were swung by the 
arguments put forward by other member states. Or they had been lobbied during the breaks. 
Or there was horse-trading going on. The Swedes, for example, did not think that ‘days lost in 
strikes’ was a good measure of the quality of the ‘social dialogue and workers involvement.’ 
They went along because another indicator (‘the percentage of employees covered by 
collective agreements’) liked by them but not by many other member states was also included   10
as a measure of ‘quality in work’. Sweden, with a relatively low number of strikes but with a 
high number of collective agreements, would score rather badly on the former but well on the 
latter.  
Sometimes member states had to abandon their initial national position because there was 
an overwhelming lack of support. The Dutch delegation, for example, agreed to including 
indicators measuring transitions between permanent contracts, fixed-term contracts and 
temporary contracts even if it thought that doing so implied a certain prejudice against non-
permanent jobs. For a member state such as the Netherlands with a high number of employees 
with fixed-term and temporary contracts, this measure would not be in its best interest. Yet 
the delegation saw it had little support from other member states and made the concession. 
Under unanimity rule, states sometimes simply have to give up part of their national interests 
for the sake of reaching an EU decision.  
As this amendment bargaining was going on, the Secretaries of the Employment 
Committee, with the President, did their best to keep track of which member wanted changes, 
which did not. When the members seemed to have exhausted their contributions and everyone 
fell silent, the President tried to suggest a ‘conclusion’. Some members were not happy with 
it, and the discussion continued. The President then tried again to conclude until everyone 
could agree. This way of agreeing is normally described as consensus decision-making, where 
issues are discussed until everyone is satisfied and convinced the best solution is on the table. 
That is not what happens, though. It was not a case of members discussing and deliberating 
until everyone actively supported a particular result. It was more of a ‘majority consensus’ 
emerging, forcing some members to compromise (Thedvall 2006). This was made clear in one 
of the Employment Committee meetings when the Italian delegate did not get support from 
other members for Italy’s preferred, particular wording of the Committee’s opinion on so-
called ‘National action plans’ for employment, drawn up by the member states each year. He 
wanted the Commission’s opinion to note explicitly that only a majority of the Committee had 
supported that particular indicator. One of the British delegates answered that they understood 
the point, but that de facto most decisions in the Committee were decided by majority vote 
(Committee Meeting, 21 November 2001). The Italian delegate continued to insist on the 
committee dropping the paragraph on the National action plans in the opinion paper. 
However, he was isolated, and the suggested changes to accommodate Italy were rejected by 
the other members. Finally, he was forced to agree for the sake of reaching an EU decision.  
 
Cultures of conflict and compromise  
EU compromises are thus made by finding solutions that can be accepted by everyone, and – 
if need be – by producing majorities that are big enough to induce (potential) dissenters to 
cease resisting the emerging majority opinion. This process is not a linear one. Opportunities 
for consensus come and go. Yet there is a bottom line. According to the EU calendar, at the 
last meeting before the Council – where the political decisions are made - there has to be a 
final Committee decision on the issues up for discussion at the Council. These deadlines 
pressure the Committee’s decision-making process. No matter how unsure the Eurocrats felt 
about certain aspects of their report, they had to collectively submit it to the Council. Not 
achieving consensus meant burdening the ministers with delays and complications. Nobody 
wants to take that message home unless it involves the essential political priorities of the 
government.  
And so there is a subtle change in the dynamics of Eurocrats’ work during a series of 
Committee meetings on any given issue. The discussions and negotiations at the beginning of 
the policy making process display a ‘culture of conflict’ (Ross 1993, also see Thedvall 2006). 
Eurocrats defended their national opinions and differences between national positions were 
highlighted not fudged. Later, when the process gravitated towards a decision and producing   11
reports for the Council, conflict and compromise become two sides of the same coin and a 
‘culture of compromise’ emerged (Abélès 1993, also see Thedvall 2006) in the Committee 
meetings. This culture of compromise makes it possible for the Eurocrats to agree, as 
‘Europeans’, in making a common EU decision.  
 
Observing Eurocrats: doing meeting ethnography 
The shifting between the roles as a national representative and a European representative also, 
in some ways, matched my own experiences of the fieldwork. My fieldwork among the 
Eurocrats moved between different localities: the Directorate General of Employment and 
Social Affairs in the Commission, the EU meeting rooms and the Swedish Ministry of 
Industry, Employment and Communication. From the start of my fieldwork, when I had an 
internship in the Commission, I was moving between the Directorate General and the meeting 
rooms, while living in Brussels during that time. During the second part of my fieldwork, I 
was doing participant observation in the preparatory meetings of the Swedish Ministry of 
Industry and followed the Swedish delegation to the EU committee. I was yoyo-ing (Wulff 
2002) in and out of the field, and back and forth to the meetings. In a sense I was moving 
between different roles of being an intern in the European Commission, an observer in the EU 
meetings and the Swedish preparatory meetings and being a researcher in a university 
environment. 
The different EU committee, working group and Council meetings became important for 
my research. It was there the work of the European Commission (with the member states) was 
debated, negotiated and decided on by the member states and the European Commission. It 
was in the meetings I was introduced to the work in the Commission that I could see existed 
on the intranet and knew was taking place but did not take part in myself. Thus, a substantial 
part of my field notes from my internship in the European Commission came from the EU 
meetings. 
My ‘strategically situated ethnography’ (Marcus 1986: 177) was mainly based in a 
particular EU committee focused on EU employment policy, the Employment Committee. 
However, the field of the Employment Committee was made up of different localities. The 
central nodes in the network were the Employment Committee’s meetings, but for the 
meetings to work as intended, that is as decision-making arenas, other nodes in the network 
had to play their part. The member states’ representatives had, for example, to adopt ‘national 
positions’ to be able to negotiate their case in the Employment Committee. In this way the 
negotiations and decisions made in the Employment Committee were influenced by 
discussions, negotiations and decision-making processes elsewhere. 
The view from the Employment Committee made it possible to see the different 
negotiations, discussions and decisions made by all the member states. In this sense it became 
a multi-local fieldwork, but in one place. It enabled me to see how member states were able to 
form decisions on the ‘quality in work’ indicators. To work in the Commission was important, 
since it was there that all the documents, papers and opinions were prepared before they were 
discussed in the Employment Committee. However, to better understand why members said 
what they did in the Employment Committee meetings, I also had to study how member states 
prepared for the meetings. To do participant observation in all the member states, I would 
have had to be in several different places at the same or nearly the same time to grasp all the 
participants’ perspectives on the same issue. This was physically impossible. To get at the 
process, I concentrated on following it through from the perspective of one member state, 
Sweden. I shadowed the Swedish members in the Employment Committee. I took part in their 
preparatory meetings in the Swedish Ministry of Industry and then went with them to Brussels 
to Committee meetings.  
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Conclusion: Eurocrats entangled in parallel worlds? 
This chapter has focused on Eurocrats and their work. I observed the bureaucratic games in 
EU committees, working groups and councils and Eurocrats’ shifting roles of defending 
‘national’ interests and acting in the interest of the EU by making EU decisions. The 
ethnographic study of Eurocrats brings them to life as people, moving beyond the stereotype. 
Their shifting roles and subtle handling of bureaucratic rules and regulations becomes visible 
only when we use such methods as participant observation. It shows that following rules and 
making technocratic EU decisions are not options for these bureaucratic elites. They have to 
be flexible in handling their multiple roles and knowing when to play, and when to stop 
playing, the game of ‘consensus’ decision making (cf. Egeberg, 2006). 
The roles Eurocrats play shift through the process; the pendulum between articulating 
and defending ‘national’ positions and acting in the interest of the EU swings back and forth. 
In this way, the Eurocrats’ shifting roles contribute to the process of Europeanisation. 
Eventaully, playing the game in Brussels forces them to put on the hat of a ‘European’ 
formulating post-national EU decisions at least some of the time. The role of the Eurocrats as 
‘national’ representative is to a great extent limited to the meeting occasions and the 
preparatory meetings surrounding them. Their nomadic periods - going to and from the 
meetings - signify a time of preparation for being a true Eurocrat, and then withdrawing from 
it again.  
These Eurocratic practices fashion and construct the entity we know as the EU. Although 
one may debate whether these EU policy decisions are changing the member states’ policies 
in any significant sense, there can be no doubt that, through the practices described here, these 
Eurocrats make decisions that go beyond the nation state. In short, these practices are a 
significant part of the fabric of an emerging post-national European policy community.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 All the names of the officials are fictional to ensure their anonymity. 
 
2 In alphabetical order, they are: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. This study took place before the ten new member states joined in 2003 and 
the EU-15 became EU-25. 
 
3 The emic is an anthropological concept that means informants have a different 
understanding of a concept or a phenomenon to that of the researchers. 
 
   13
References 
Abélès, Marc. 1993. ‘Political anthropology of the trans-national institution: the European 
parliament’. French Politics & Society, 11(1): 1-19. 
Albrow, Martin. 1997. Do organizations have feelings? London: Routledge. 
Ben-Ari, Eyal and Elron, Efrat. 2001. ‘Blue helmets and white armour: multi-nationalism and 
multi-culturalism among UN peacekeeping forces’. City & Society, 8(2): 275-306. 
Borneman, John and Fowler, Nick. 1997. ‘Europeanisation’. Annual Review of Anthropology, 
26: 487-514. 
Callon, Michel. 1998. Introduction: the embeddedness of economic markets in economics, in 
Michel Callon (Ed.), The laws of the market. Oxford: Blackwell Publisher. 
Cooper, Robert. 2003. The breaking of nations: Order and chaos in the twenty-first century. 
London: Atlantic Books. 
Council of the European Union. 2000. Council Decision 2000/98/EC. Official Journal of the 
European Communities. 
Cowles, Maria Green, Caporaso, James and Risse, Thomas (Eds.). 2001. Transforming 
Europe: Europeanisation and domestic change. London: Cornell University Press. 
Delanty, Gerhard and Rumford, Chris. 2005. Rethinking Europe. Social theory and the 
implications of Europeanisation. London: Routledge. 
Egeberg, Morten. 2006. ‘Executive Politics as Usual: Role Behaviour and Conflict 
Dimensions in the College of European Commissioners’. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 13(1): 1-15 
Featherstone, Kevin and Radaelli, Claudio M. (Eds.). 2003. The Politics of Europeanisation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Garsten, Christina and Montoya, Monica Lindh de (Eds.). 2004. Market matters: Exploring 
cultural processes in the global marketplace. Houndsmills, Baskingstoke: Palgrave-
Macmillan. 
Hasselström, Anna. 2003. On and off the trading floor: an inquiry into the everyday 
fashioning of financial market knowledge. Stockholm: Department of Social 
Anthropology, Stockholm University. 
Herzfeld, Michel. 1992. The social production of indifference: Exploring the symbolic roots 
of western bureaucracy. London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Jacobsson, Bengt and Mörth, Ulrika. 1998. ‘Europeiseringen och den svenska staten’, in 
Göran Ahrne (Ed.), Stater som organisationer. Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus Förlag. 
Jacobsson, Bengt, Lægreid, Per and Pedersen. Ove K. 2004. Europeanisation and 
transnational states: Comparing Nordic central governments. London: Routledge. 
Lipsky, Micheal. 1980. Street-level bureaucracy. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Malkki, Liisa H. 1999[1997]. ‘National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the 
Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees’, in Akhil Gupta and 
James Ferguson (Eds.), Culture power place: Explorations in critical anthropology. 
London: Duke University Press. 
Marcus, George E. 1986. ‘Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World 
System’, in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (Eds.), Writing culture: Poetics and 
politics of ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Radaelli, Claudio M. 2003. ‘The Europeanisation of Public Policy’, in Kevin Featherstone 
and Claudio M. Radaelli  (Eds.),  The Politics of Europeanisation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ross, Marc Howard. 1993. The culture of conflict: Interpretations and interests in 
comparative perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press.    14
Thedvall, Renita. 2006. Eurocrats at work: Negotiating transparency in post-national 
employment policy. Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology, No. 58. Stockholm: 
Almqvist and Wiksell International. 
Turner, Victor. 1969. The ritual process: Structure and anti-structure. New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter. 
Weber, Max. 1958 [1946]. From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Translated, Edited, with an 
Introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Weiss, Gilbert and Wodak, Ruth. 2000. ‘Debating Europe: globalization rhetoric and 
European Union unemployment policies’, in Irène Bellier and Thomas M. Wilson (Eds.), 
An anthropology of the European Union: Building, imagining and experiencing the new 
Europe. Oxford: Berg. 
Wulff, Helena. 2002. ‘Yo-Yo fieldwork: mobility and time in a multi-local study of dance in 
Ireland’.  Anthropological Journal on European Cultures, issue on Shifting Grounds: 
Experiments in Doing Ethnography, 11: 117-136. 